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Forthcoming in Constitutional Commentary

Why Jack Balkin is Disgusting

Andrew Koppelman*

Yale Law Professor Jack Balkin didn’t win friends when
he announced that (1) he is now a constitutional
originalist and (2) the original meaning of the Fourteenth
Amendment protects the right to abortion.1

His claim to

membership in the originalist club brought forth a small
army of eager bouncers, who were sure that originalism
couldn’t possibly defend the paradigmatic departure from
the Constitution’s original meaning.2
Balkin has indeed posed a radical challenge to the
vision of law that drives the originalists – more radical

* John Paul Stevens Professor of Law and Professor of Political Science,
Northwestern University. Thanks to Jack Balkin, Shari Diamond, Peter
DiCola, Eugene Kontorovich, Martha Nussbaum, Jim Pfander, and Steven D.
Smith for helpful comments on an earlier draft.
1
Jack M. Balkin, Abortion and Original Meaning, 24 Const. Comm. 291
(2007); Jack M. Balkin, Original Meaning and Constitutional Redemption,
24 Const. Comm. 427 (2007).
2
See, e.g., Steven D. Smith, That Old Time Originalism, June 23, 2008,
at 11, available at
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1150447 (“Balkin’s
acceptance of originalism may seem surprising, given his general
tendencies and preferred conclusions: it is almost as if Christopher
Hitchens were to announce that he has become a born again Christian.”).
I have had conversations with many colleagues, both originalist and
nonoriginalist, who are confident that Balkin has got to be kidding.
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than he is willing to admit.

His theory is in such deep

tension with a commonly held vision of the rule of law that
his argument is, to put the point precisely, disgusting.
But that doesn’t mean that he is wrong.

*

Balkin argues that the best version of originalism is
based, not upon the way in which the framing generation
would have expected the text to be applied, but rather upon
the public meaning of the text.

The Fourteenth Amendment

enacts principles of equal citizenship.

Those principles

are violated if the state uses women’s capacity for
pregnancy as a basis for assigning them a second class
status or denying them liberty.
Originalism, Balkin argues, is not inconsistent with
the idea of a living constitution, because in practice the
meaning of constitutional principles shifts over time.
Some constitutional terms, such as “equal protection,” are
intentionally abstract, leaving the specification to be
worked out by later generations.

Mobilized social

movements, invoking their own interpretations of those
texts, play a legitimate role in determining which

2

specification will ultimately prevail.3

The constitutional

protection of sex equality, for example, is the consequence
of the feminist movement of the 1970s, which changed the
mind of the public in a way that eventually was reflected
in the interpretation of the Constitution.4

The triumph of

gun rights in District of Columbia v. Heller5 is another
example.6
Some originalists have disputed Balkin’s specific
argument about abortion, but that disagreement doesn’t
explain the scandal that Balkin has provoked.7

The real

issue is the suggestion that originalism is capacious
enough to support this result. The idea that social
movements shape constitutional law is particularly
distressing to originalists, who are committed to the idea
that the Constitution’s meaning does not shift over time.
John McGinnis and Michael Rappaport write, “it is a little
difficult to see what is left of a recognizable
originalism, not to mention the amendment process, if
3

Abortion and Original Meaning at 305, 308-09; Constitutional
Redemption at 456-57, 491, 493-6, 504-11.
4
Jack M. Balkin, Framework Originalism and the Living Constitution, 103
Nw. U. L. Rev. 549, 574, 582 (2009).
5
128 S.Ct. 2783 (2008).
6
Framework Originalism at 584.
7
My interest here is that scandal, not Balkin’s specific argument,
which I won’t discuss further except to note that I’m sympathetic to
the kind of move he is making. See Andrew Koppelman, Forced Labor,
Revisited: The Thirteenth Amendment and Abortion, in Alexander Tsesis,
ed., Promises of Liberty: Thirteenth Amendment Abolitionism and Its
Contemporary Vitality (forthcoming 2010); Andrew Koppelman, Forced
Labor: A Thirteenth Amendment Defense of Abortion, 84 Nw. U. L. Rev.
480 (1990).
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social movements have such substantial discretion to apply
constitutional provisions as they see fit.”8

Steven

Calabresi and Livia Fine claim that Balkin’s originalism
“substitutes the rule of engaged social movements for the
rule of law.”9
These charges draw blood only if there is a feasible
alternative to the world contemplated by Balkin – an
originalism that purges adjudication of discretion and the
vagaries of political change.
Balkin’s argument is both descriptive and normative.
The descriptive part is an account of how constitutional
interpretation is done in the United States – how
constitutional interpreters in this culture make their way
from the spectacularly vague commands of “equal protection”
and “due process” to determinate legal outcomes.
normative part pronounces this process good.

The

Like so many

liberal legal theorists in the age of the Rehnquist and
Roberts Courts, Balkin is a stodgy defender of the status
quo.
Putting it this way, however, understates the
radicalism of his conservatism.

His earlier writings imply

that it is simply impossible for constitutional law to have
8

John McGinnis & Michael Rappaport, Original Interpretive Principles as
the Core of Originalism, 24 Const. Comm. 371, 381 (2007).
9
Steven G. Calabresi & Livia Fine, Two Cheers for Professor Balkin’s
Originalism, 103 Nw. U. L. Rev. 663, 687 (2009).
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the fixity and determinacy that his critics long for.
Constitutional interpreters are condemned to be free.10

*

The giddy vertigo implicit in Balkin’s theory is made
clearer in his earlier book, Cultural Software11 - a book he
has not so much as mentioned for several years now, for
reasons we will consider shortly.

Cultural Software

ambitiously seeks to synthesize evolutionary biology,
hermeneutics, semiotics, anthropology, psychology,
linguistics, sociology, and many other disciplines into a
unified theory of ideology.
Following the evolutionary biologist Richard Dawkins,
Balkin argues that the basic units of thought are “memes,”
contagious ideas, traditions, styles, and behaviors that
manage to get themselves transmitted from one mind to
another.

Handshakes, melodies, clichés, styles of dress

are all memes; they “encompass all forms of cultural knowhow that can be passed to others through . . . imitation

10

The phrase “condemned to be free” is Sartre’s. See Jean-Paul Sartre,
Being and Nothingness 152 (1943; Routledge 2003). Balkin’s affinity
with existentialism is made clear in J.M. Balkin, Tradition, Betrayal,
and the Politics of Deconstruction, 11 Cardozo L. Rev. 1613, 1629-30
(1990).
11
J.M. Balkin, Cultural Software: A Theory of Ideology (1998).
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and communication.”12

These are combined, in a necessarily

ad hoc and untidy way, into the “abilities, associations,
heuristics, metaphors, narratives, and capacities that we
employ in understanding and evaluating the world.”13
How is it that given memes manage to replicate
themselves over time?

Balkin suggests that there is no

single answer to this question.

The difference between a

meme and a gene is that biologists have converged on a
single account of what a gene is and how it replicates
itself.

Memes, on the other hand, replicate themselves in

a bewildering variety of ways.

The tune “Three Blind Mice”

manages to perpetuate itself from one generation to the
next; so does the practice of brushing teeth; but the
mechanisms are different.
Sometimes these heterogeneous mechanisms are mutually
reinforcing.

The persistence of racism is an example.

Racism can be produced by “dissonance reduction among
subordinate groups, by conceptual imperialism among
dominant groups, by faulty inferences from prototypes and
salient examples, by conceptual homologies that oppose
blackness and whiteness, by suppression and projection of
superior and inferior associations, by social scripts
featuring stock characters and expectations about ethnic
12
13

Id. at 43.
Id. at 6.
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groups, and by recurrent cultural narratives about the
American ‘savage war.’”14
are mutually reinforcing.

These different cognitive tools
“Ideological mechanisms are the

result of bricolage and circumstance; their heterogeneity
and disorder are the best evidence of their historical
emergence.”15

Their effects can only be countered by

criticism that uses other cognitive tools of the same kind,
contingent mechanisms that have been thrown into our hands
by historical circumstance.
Balkin wants to evaluate ideological effects by their
justice or injustice.

Justice, he thinks, is a

transcendent ideal, “an inchoate yearning that we attempt
to articulate through our cultural constructions.”16

It

“can never be perfectly realized,”17 but it has an
irresistible power just the same.

It is puzzling how this

transcendent aspiration can have the anchoring effect
Balkin contemplates amid the world of flux that he
describes.18

It appears to be necessary to take it as an

object of practical faith that it does.

“[T]ranscendent

ideals are presupposed by the rhetorical situation of
14

Id. at 258.
Id.
16
Id. at 162.
17
Id. at 144.
18
He writes elsewhere that the sense of justice “is an inchoate,
indeterminate and indefinite drive that acts as a goad rather than as a
guide.” J.M. Balkin, Being Just With Deconstruction, 3 Soc. & Leg.
Stud. 393, 402 (1994).
15
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having to persuade an audience.

They seem to spring forth

magically from the rhetorical encounter.”19
But a judgment of justice or injustice does not help
us understand the mechanisms by which ideological effects
operate.

Unlike earlier theorists such as Marx, Balkin

assigns no distinct etiology to pernicious ideologies.
Just and unjust forms of cultural knowledge perpetuate
themselves through the same strategies.
Balkin’s understanding of collective deliberation,
David Charny observes, is
a sort of war of all against all, a return to the
state of nature, except that the warriors are not so
much individuals as the memes that define individuals
and that use them as vectors of propagation. The
public space is not a collection of rational selves,
but a swarm of viral particles of information.20
The outcome of rhetorical contestation will
necessarily be chaotic and unpredictable.

A fortiori, this

19

Cultural Software at 149.
David Charny, Farewell to an Idea? Ideology in Legal Theory, 97
Mich. L. Rev. 1596, 1614 (1999)(review of Cultural Software). Charny
continues: “What rescues this from utter bleakness is the
(individually limited though collectively determinative) power of each
self to influence memetic propagation, and the celebratory sense in
which this diversity spawns ideals and aspirations that might elude a
more tightly controlled communal discourse.” Id. This celebration of
the proliferation of diverse cultural forms is also a central theme in
Balkin’s approach to questions of free speech. See, e.g., J.M. Balkin,
Digital Speech and Democratic Culture: A Theory of Freedom of
Expression for the Information Society, 79 NYU L. Rev. 1 (2004).
20

8

is true of constitutional contestation.

What constrains

constitutional law is not a set of rules, but a set of
rhetorical norms, themselves unstable and shifting over
time, that determine which moves are legitimate.

Richard

Posner has observed that “thinking like a lawyer” really
means “an awareness of approximately how plastic law is at
the frontiers – neither infinitely plastic . . . nor rigid
and predetermined, as many laypersons think.”21

Balkin

agrees, and emphasizes the way in which the boundaries
shift as culture does, so that an argument regarded as
crackpot and “off the wall” at one time becomes accepted
doctrine later on.22

*

Balkin wrote in 1997, the year before Cultural
Software appeared, that “[o]ur theories of the Constitution
are makeshift attempts, reflecting the concerns of our era,
21

Richard Posner, The Problems of Jurisprudence 100 (1993).
Abortion and Original Meaning at 309; Constitutional Redemption at
514; Framework Originalism at 577, 584, 588, 605. The bald fact of
endorsement by powerful political actors can shift the boundaries of
the crackpot, as when constitutional interpretations which “would have
been regarded by most lawyers and judges as off the wall” became
respectable when the Supreme Court endorsed them in Bush v. Gore, 531
U.s. 98 (2001). Jack M. Balkin, Idolatry and Faith: The Jurisprudence
of Sanford Levinson, 38 Tulsa L. Rev. 553, 567-68 (2003). Any
suspicion that Balkin himself regards legal argument as infinitely
plastic is dispelled by his appalled reaction to that decision. See
Jack M. Balkin, Bush v. Gore and the Boundary between Law and Politics,
110 Yale L. J. 1407 (2001).
22
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but dressed up as timeless claims about interpretation.”23
The Constitution never really measures up to our
transcendent ideal of justice.

The turn to ideal

constitutionalism, which identifies the Constitution with
that transcendent ideal, is a way of coping with the
cognitive dissonance this produces.24

But even our

aspirations are historically conditioned.
out of our own skin.

We can’t step

We can imagine redemption, but we are

fated to live in a fallen world.25
Balkin doesn’t talk like this any more.
the dressing-up business himself.

He’s now in

This is clearest in his

discussion of the question of the weight of precedent.
[S]ocial movements sometimes succeed because they
correctly see that the world has changed and that we
must implement constitutional principles differently
than we did before.

When constitutional doctrine

responds to their arguments, we should value these new
decisions not because they are precedents, and not
23

J.M. Balkin, Agreements With Hell and Other Objects of Our Faith, 63
Fordham L. Rev. 1703, 1719 (1997).
24
Id. at 1731. He is evidently influenced here by his former Texas
colleague Philip Bobbitt, who likewise denies that there is any
algorithm for constitutional interpretation, but defends the consequent
indeterminacy on the basis that it “gives us a way to measure a
possible legal world against our sense of rightness, going back and
forth between a proposed interpretation and its world, and ourselves.”
Constitutional Interpretation 158 (1991). Balkin frequently refers to
Bobbitt’s modalities of constitutional law, which entail indeterminacy.
See, e.g., Constitutional Redemption at 483, 484, 485, 511.
25
The implicit theology here is more Jewish than Christian: not only
is the Messiah’s arrival endlessly deferred, he has never been here.
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because social movements supported them, but because
these decisions better implement constitutional text
and principle in changing times.26
Precedents are to be judged against the text, but the text
is a placeholder for our aspirations, which transcend any
text.

This is what “better” means in the sentence just

quoted.

Because our background assumptions and aspirations

shift over time, the Constitution can no more have a stable
meaning than anything else in the fluid world of cultural
software.

Balkin rejects “the idolatry of mathematical

precision in legal reasoning.”27

The boundary that

separates the plausible from the implausible
is the boundary that distinguishes the Rule of Law
from the arbitrary exercise of power.

But if that

boundary is not fixed, but moveable, and if that
boundary can be moved through politics, or through the
assertions of powerful people who seek to maintain
their power, the certainty of our faith in law might
well be shaken.28

26

Constitutional Redemption at 478. Smith observes that Balkin uses a
bewildering variety of verbs to describe the relation between text and
principle: “underlie,” “points to,” “embodies,” “presumes,”
“adopt[s],” “enacts,” “endorses,” “employs,” is “connected to,”
“attempt[s] to embrace.” Smith, That Old Time Originalism, at 11-12.
27
Balkin, Idolatry and Faith, at 562.
28
Id. at 568.
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So in his recent constitutional writings, Balkin is
gentle about delivering this bad news.

I suspect that this

is why, contrary to his own wry professional advice to
legal academics to cite yourself whenever possible, he has
hardly ever cited Cultural Software in his constitutional
work, and a few years ago stopped doing so altogether.29
This hasn’t kept his critics from feeling that Balkin
has taken something precious from them.

Orin Kerr declares

that Balkin “attempts to eliminate the rhetorical power of
originalist arguments by making essentially everything an
originalist argument.”30

Ed Whelan, noting the “near-

infinite malleability” of Balkin’s theory, argues that “a
theory that can explain anything really explains nothing.”31
Matthew Franck writes that Balkin has “succeeded only in
destroying everything about the edifice of originalism
except the sign that hung on the building, which he picked
up from the rubble and slapped on the construct hitherto

29

J.M. Balkin & Sanford Levinson, How to Win Cites and Influence
People, 71 Chi.-Kent L. Rev. 843, 856-59 (1996). A Westlaw search of
“au(balkin) & "cultural software"” yielded four articles citing the
book, the most recent from 2005. When asked about this reticence,
Prof. Balkin responded: “There are many connections between Early
Balkin and Later Balkin, but they are esoteric and none of them are
particularly useful to readers.” Personal communication, June 25,
2009. Pay no attention to that man behind the curtain.
30
Orin Kerr, Jack Balkin, Soul-killer,
http://prawfsblawg.blogs.com/prawfsblawg/2008/08/jack-balkin-sou.html
(visited June 26, 2009).
31
Ed Whelan, Reply to Balkin on Abortion and Original Meaning—Part 1,
available at
http://bench.nationalreview.com/post/?q=ZDJlYjM1MDYyYmM0MzM1OTE0NjhmZTB
lMmFhYTRhMjI= (visited June 26, 2009).
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known as the ‘living Constitution.’"32

Conversations with

other constitutional scholars have shown me that these
comments are only the tip of the iceberg.

The sheer

outrage that Balkin has provoked demands explanation.

*

The resistance to Balkin’s indeterminacy claim – a
resistance he understands, which is why he’s so coy about
the depth of the indeterminacy – operates in much the same
way as the cognitive content of the emotion of disgust.
Research in psychology, Martha Nussbaum reports, finds that
disgust “has a complex cognitive content, which focuses on
the idea of incorporation of a contaminant.”33

People will

not eat food that has even briefly touched an unacceptable
object, even if that object is harmless, such as a
sterilized cockroach.

“The ideational content of disgust

is that the self will become base or contaminated by
ingestion of the substance that is viewed as offensive.”34
The objects of disgust tend to focus on animals and animal
32

Matthew Franck, Jumping to Conclusions, National Review Online, Aug.
18, 2007, available at
http://bench.nationalreview.com/post/?q=YmJiMzc3OTc3YjZlMGY4YzJjOTRiODc
0NTk2ZTdhNWY= (visited June 26, 2009).
33
Martha C. Nussbaum, Hiding From Humanity: Disgust, Shame, and the
Law 87 (2004). See also Martha Nussbaum, Upheavals of Thought: The
Intelligence of Emotions 200-06, 220-22, 346-50 (2001).
34
Nussbaum, Hiding From Humanity at 88.
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waste products.

“[T]he motivating idea has to do with our

interest in policing the boundary between ourselves and
nonhuman animals, or our own animality.”35
The core objects of disgust are those that remind us
of our animal vulnerability and mortality.

This emotion

appears to be an inevitable part of civilization, but,
Nussbaum observes, it has a dangerous tendency to be
associated with group subordination. “[T]hroughout history,
certain disgust properties – sliminess, bad smell,
stickiness, decay, foulness – have repeatedly and
monotonously been associated with, indeed projected onto,
groups by reference to whom privileged groups seek to
define their superior human status.

Jews, women,

homosexuals, untouchables, lower-class people – all these
are imagined as tainted by the dirt of the body.”36

Such

projected disgust is contrasted with an ideal of the pure,
hard, uncontaminated, impenetrable, invulnerable self – a
dangerous delusion, precisely because it tends to produce
such projections.37

35

Id. at 89.
Id. at 108.
37
Id. at 107-115. It would be delusional even if it did not produce
these ideological effects, insofar as it rests on denial of one’s own
mortality. See Cathy R. Cox, Jamie L. Goldenberg, Tom Pyszczynski &
David Weise, Disgust, Creatureliness and the Accessibility of DeathRelated Thoughts, 37 Eur. J. Soc. Psychol. 494 (2007). As it happens,
disgust sensitivity is associated with conservative political
attitudes. Yoel Inbar, David A. Pizarro, & Paul Bloom, Conservatives
Are More Easily Disgusted Than Liberals, 23 Cognition & Emotion 714
36

14

The hard impenetrable constitutional theory, one that
is self-sufficient and not vulnerable to penetration by
discretion and contingency, is a similar self-protective
delusion.38

The continuing appeal of originalism has become

increasingly puzzling as it has become clear that it is as
contingent and contestable as any of its rivals.39

The

disgust that Balkin elicits offers an answer to the puzzle.
Steven D. Smith, who understands the role of faith in
constitutional theory better than most, laments that after
Balkin, "originalism is no longer available as a distinct
approach to further (or at least attempt to further) the
worthy purposes . . . for which it was devised – namely,
constraining courts in history-grounded ways, and
preserving the ability of democratic institutions to enact
constitutional provisions with relatively definite and
fixed meanings. That seems a regrettable loss (even for
those who doubt originalism’s ability ultimately to provide

(2009); Yoel Inbar, David A. Pizarro, Joshua Knobe, & Paul Bloom,
Disgust Sensitivity Predicts Intuitive Disapproval of Gays, 9 Emotion
435 (2009).
38
Bobbitt observes that in Robert Bork’s shift from libertarianism to
originalism, what persists is the “yearning to escape from mere
politics to a decisive world of rules.” Constitutional Interpretation
at 102.
39
On the varieties of originalism, see Thomas B. Colby & Peter J.
Smith, Living Originalism, available at
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1090282. On the
other hand, originalism is not infinitely plastic. It cannot support
an argument that misrepresents its sources or conceals pertinent
evidence. See Andrew Koppelman, Phony Originalism and the
Establishment Clause, 103 Nw. U. L. Rev. 727 (2009).

15

what it promises)."40

Smith is nostalgic for that lost

paradise, even though he knows that it never really
existed.

He flirts with (but cannot bring himself to

surrender to) the bad faith of fundamentalism, which
rejects modernity even though it is itself a product and
reflection of modernity.41
Balkin’s invocation of originalism simultaneously
invokes and undermines that fixity and stability.

“The

tropes of fidelity to text and principle, and of their
restoration and redemption in history are not simply fables
we tell themselves,” he writes.

“These tropes allow us to

see the Constitution as a transgenerational project that
connects different generations and identifies them as a
single people stretched out over time.”42

This is like

saying that God is not simply a fable because the idea of
God allows the church to see itself as a single community.
It doesn’t answer the question.

The community would very

much like to know whether the object of its faith is real.
Eric Posner is right that Balkin is “trying to figure out
what the PR angle of originalism is and how to duplicate

40

Smith, That Old Time Originalism, at 11.
On the bad faith of fundamentalism, see Peter L. Berger, The
Heretical Imperative: Contemporary Possibilities of Religious
Affirmation 61-86 (1979).
42
Constitutional Redemption at 522.
41
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it."43

The problem is like the quandary of atheists who

want to invoke religious language because it symbolically
expresses human aspirations, even though whatever power the
language has depends on the sense that God is a reality and
not merely a metaphor.44
Balkin isn’t merely faking it, because he thinks that
the transcendent ideal of justice can endure any amount of
deconstruction.

“[E]ven the faithful, even the person who

believes in God fervently and devotedly, knows that the
works of religion, the products of religion, the practices
and conventions of religion, are made by mortal human
beings, by communities of belief that extend and evolve
over time, sometimes over many centuries.”45

In the same

way, even the person who firmly believes in the rule of law
knows that it is made by fallible mortals.

“So even the

most devoted face the dangers inherent in faith, and they
face them not because they are agnostic but precisely
because they have given their lives over to faith.”46

The

43

Quoted in Ari Shapiro, Conservatives Have 'Originalism'; Liberals
Have ... ?, NPR All Things Considered, June 23, 2009, available at
http://www.npr.org/templates/story/story.php?storyId=105439966&ps=cprs
(visited June 26, 2009).
44
Simon Blackburn, Religion and Respect, in Philosophers Without Gods:
Meditations on Atheism and the Secular Life 179 (Louise M. Antony ed.
2007).
45
Balkin, Idolatry and Faith, at 558.
46
Id. Further evidence that doubt is not equivalent to faking it is
provided by Pope Benedict XVI:
[B]oth the believer and the unbeliever share, each in his own
way, doubt and belief, if they do not hide from themselves and

17

framers displayed their faith by codifying abstract ideals
such as equal protection.

When we today offer our best

understanding of those ideals, we manifest the same faith.
That is a kind of originalism.

But it’s not the kind that

conservative originalists were hoping for.
Balkin thinks that faith is possible without endorsing
implausible factual claims about the world.

But human

beings evidently vary in the degree to which they need to
believe such claims in order to sustain their faith.47

The

preacher may be vividly aware of the facts that make faith
difficult, but that doesn’t obligate him to talk about them
in every sermon.
We live in a world in which the Constitution isn’t
really a higher standard outside ourselves.

It is a human

construct, legitimated, if at all, by things unseen.

We

are, perhaps, all that the Constitution is constituted out

from the truth of their being. Neither can quite escape either
doubt or belief; for the one, faith is present against doubt; for
the other, through doubt and in the form of doubt. It is the
basic pattern of man's destiny only to be allowed to find the
finality of his existence in this unceasing rivalry between doubt
and belief, temptation and certainty. Perhaps in precisely this
way doubt, which saves both sides from being shut up in their own
worlds, could become an avenue of communication. It prevents
both from enjoying complete self-satisfaction; it opens up the
believer to the doubter and the doubter to the believer; for one,
it is his share in the fate of the unbeliever; for the other, the
form in which belief remains nevertheless a challenge to him.
Joseph Cardinal Ratzinger, Introduction to Christianity 40-1 (rev. ed.
2004).
47
See Andrew Koppelman, Naked Strong Evaluation, 56 DISSENT 105 (Winter
2009) (book review of CHARLES TAYLOR, A SECULAR AGE (2007)).
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of.

Its innards are as slimy as ours.

How disgusting is

that?

19

